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Dynamic analysis is an important technique to reveal sensitive be-
havior of Android apps. Current works require access to the code-
level and system-level events (e.g., API calls and system calls) trig-
gered by the running apps and consequently they can only be
conducted on in-lab running environments (e.g., emulators and
modied OS). The strict requirement of running environment hin-
ders their deployment in scale and makes them vulnerable to anti-
analysis techniques. Furthermore, current dynamic analysis of An-
droid apps exploits input generators to invoke app behavior, which,
however, cannot provide sucient code coverage.
We propose to dynamically analyze app behavior on non-rooted
devices used by the public so that it is possible to analyze dynami-
cally in scale without input generators. By doing so, we also max-
imize the code coverage since the app behavior is invoked by real
users of the apps. To achieve such a goal, we build UpDroid, a sys-
tem for detecting sensitive behavior without modifying Android
OS, rooting the device, or leveraging emulators. UpDroid detects
sensitive events by monitoring the changing of public resources on
the device, instead of accessing low-level events that require root-
ing or system modication. To identify the apps that trigger the
detected events, UpDroid formulates the identication as a rank-
ing problem and adopts learning to rank technique to solve it. Our
experimental results demonstrate that UpDroid can successfully
detect the use of 15 out of 26 permissions that are labeled danger-
ous in the ocial Android documentation. We also compare Up-
Droid with API hooking which can theoretically capture all sen-
sitive behavior but requires root permission and system modica-
tions. Results show that UpDroid can still achieve 70% coverage of
API hooking even without root permission or any system modi-
cations.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Android has been the most popular mobile system which occu-
pies over 85% market share in Q1 2017 [19]. Along with the popu-
larity, the Android community also faces various threats, such as
malware[42], pirated apps [41] and so on. One of the most impor-
tant mitigation techniques for these threats is the eective and pre-
cise dynamic analysis to reveal the underlying sensitive behavior
of apps.
Most of existing techniques conduct analysis on emulators or
modied systems. Analyzing under these environments requires
input generation tools [1, 17, 23, 34] to automatically execute the
target apps. However, most input generators can only provide a
random series of events, e.g., touching on the screen, to mimic real
users’ behavior. The random behavior generated by these tools can
hardly match the pattern of the real app usage to successfully in-
voke certain functionalities, e.g., registration. Hence, input gener-
ators cannot provide as wide code coverage as humans. Choud-
hary et al. compared several popular monkey tools and found that
the best coverage that these tools can reach is 40% [10]. Mean-
while, anti-analysis techniques [20, 31] allow apps to recognize
the running environment and hide their sensitive behavior accord-
ingly. For example, apps can detect whether the running environ-
ment is emulated based on the GPS info or IMEI number. Moreover,
anti-analysis techniques can choose to trigger sensitive behavior
only under specic circumstances that have no dependencies on
program inputs, e.g., after receiving an SMS, at a particular time
slot, or when receiving a remote command [32]. Both the insu-
cient code coverage of the input generators and the anti-analysis
features of the target apps hinder existing dynamic analysis from
invoking the potential behavior of them. Theoretically, to enable
large-scale deployment and evade anti-analysis techniques, the op-
timal solution is to conduct the analysis on devices used by the gen-
eral public. In this paper, we study towhat extent dynamic analysis
can be applied to non-rooted and unmodied devices.
Dynamically analyzing apps’ behavior on such devices is chal-
lenging. Previous tools [6, 8, 12, 29, 30, 37] adopt API tracing, sys-
tem call tracing and so on, to infer the underlying behavior of the
apps. As low-level information (e.g., API call or system call) com-
monly used by previous works is not accessible on non-rooted de-
vices, these techniques cannot be applied to devices used by the
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public. To deal with this problem, we propose a system called Up-
Droid. Instead of logging low-level events, we monitor the state
changing of dierent types of public resources on the target de-
vice. The changes convey information about the sensitive behav-
ior of the apps. For example, we can monitor message sending be-
havior by detecting the newly added rows of the content provider
content://sms. The changing event corresponds to behavior that
has been successfully performed on the devices, which is dierent
from detecting attempts of actions through tracing API calls. Un-
like existing works which can hook into the apps, monitoring the
state changes of public resources brings another challenge – iden-
tifying the apps that trigger the monitored events. Hence, we use
machine learning techniques to build a model for identifying the
apps at runtime.
UpDroid can monitor various events including making phone
calls, accessing the camera, reading/writing les and so on. It achieves
around 80% precision in identifying the apps that trigger the ob-
served events. We compare UpDroid with the traditional API hook-
ing to study how far UpDroid can go in covering dierent types
of behavior and how it is dierent from the traditional hooking
method. Experimental results demonstrate that the events UpDroid
can capture cover 15 out of 26 dangerous permissions, while API
hooking covers 21. The permissions covered by UpDroid contain
the popular ones used by both malware and benign apps. From
tests on several popular apps, we observe that UpDroid detects the
result-based events and API hooking misses some because of the
incompleteness of the sensitive API list.
The main contributions of this work are as follows.
• Wepropose a dynamic analysis system named UpDroid that
is applicable to unmodied and non-rooted devices used by
the public.
• We propose several methods for monitoring dierent types
of sensitive behavior based on the state changing of public
resources on the devices.
• We propose to use a machine learning technique – learn-
ing to rank, to establish the relationship between running
apps and the detected events. This method addresses the
challenge of app identication on unmodied devices.
• WecompareUpDroidwith the traditional API tracingmethod.
The result shows that UpDroid can handle most of the cases
that API tracing can handle and stands out in revealing the
behavior that has been successfully performed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 intro-
duces the background knowledge and motivation of this work. Sec-
tion 3 presents the framework of UpDroid. Section 4 and Section 5
discuss the detailed techniques. Section 6 presents the comparison
between UpDroid and API hooking. Section 7 presents the capa-
bility analysis of UpDroid. Section 8 discusses the related work.
Finally, Section 9 concludes this paper with future directions.
2 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
In this section, we introduce some background information for this
work and present the current state of sensitive behavior monitor-
ing on Android to motivate this work.
2.1 Resources and Observers
Android has mature security protection mechanisms based on its
permissionmodel and the security features inherited from the Linux
kernel. Guarded by these mechanisms, third-party apps have lim-
ited access to the static and runtime resources of the device. Nor-
mally, only with legal permission declaring and requesting an app
could access the protected resources and perform sensitive behav-
ior. In this paper, we propose to monitor state changing of four cat-
egories of resources which are normally available for third-party
apps to detect the sensitive behavior.
Content Provider. Content provider is an app component pro-
vided by Android for managing access to a structured set of data. It
is often used to store users’ personal information, such as SMS, call
logs, contact information and so on [15]. Content provider encap-
sulates the data and providesmechanisms for security.With proper
permission, third-party apps can access the content providers that
are open to external apps. Various functionalities are implemented
with content providers, e.g., the default app for sending and receiv-
ing SMS uses content provider to store the SMS logs. Android pro-
vides the ContentObserver API for receiving callbacks of changes
to a content provider to monitor the content provider events. For
example, a malware named HongTouTou uses this API to monitor
the SMS content provider and delete particular SMS according to
the changes [38].
External Storage. The le system of Android inherits that of the
Linux kernel. The les are protected with read/write/execute per-
mission for each user. Therefore, on non-rooted devices, we can
only monitor the les or directories which are readable to third-
party apps. For example, we cannot monitor system les under
/data/ directory, since the external apps don’t have the read per-
mission. External storage (known as the /sdcard directory) is a
platform-specicle systemmodule onAndroid, which is public to
third-party apps . To access external storage, apps always need per-
mission READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE or WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE.
In this work, we focus on monitoring external storage directory.
Previousworks use FileObserver to notify the le system changes [18].
Interrupt Statistics. The logs of the interrupts raised to the ker-
nel are also readable to third-party apps through a virtual le in-
terface – /proc/interrupts. With this interface, users can obtain
information about how many interrupts have been received by the
CPU since booting. Previous work [13] uses this interface to infer
user’s sensitive information, e.g., unlock pattern. We can use this
interface to observe the use of dierent resources on the device,
e.g., the camera, the Bluetooth, the NFC and so on. More details
can be found in Section 4.
Network. Network is another kind of resource for users to ac-
cess during runtime. With INTERNET or ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE
permission, apps can obtain the connection state, open URLs, or
send/receive TCP/UDP packets. To monitor the network activities,
previous work MopEye [35] leverages VpnService API to inter-
cept all trac initiated from apps on the devices. This API is de-
signed for app developers to build VPN apps.
Although we can observe these resources to represent sensitive
events on the device, identifying the apps that trigger the events is
213
Towards Dynamically Monitoring Android Applications WiSec ’18, June 18–20, 2018, Stockholm, Sweden
still a mystery. In this paper, we integrate these observers to build
a monitor for capturing the sensitive events on the devices and use
machine learning techniques to identify the initiator of them.
2.2 Motivation
Table 1 lists existing works about dynamic analysis of sensitive
behavior. We can observe that they need to use API calls, system
calls, and other low-level events to reveal the underlying behavior
of the target apps. For example, CopperDroid [30] observes and dis-
sects the system calls made by an app to reconstruct the behavior,
e.g., le operations. A majority of these works are based on in-lab
running environment, including VM (Virtual Machine)-based em-
ulators, modied OS/Android internals, and rooted devices.
Table 1: Existing tools for analyzing sensitive behavior of
Android apps
Tool Platform Features
DroidScope [37] QEMU based Emulator
API call, system call, Dalvik
instruction and so on.
CopperDroid [30] QEMU based emulator
API constructed from system
call
VetDroid [40] Modied system API call




DroidBox [22] Modied system API call
Relying on the in-lab running environment, previous work re-
quires input generation tools [17, 23] to automatically run the tar-
get apps. However, the event series generated by these tools cannot
match the logic of mobile apps which is usually complicated, e.g.,
most apps require registration following strict commands. Choud-
hary et al. present that the maximum coverage of popular input
generator tools is only 40% even with sucient time for running
the apps [10]. Our intuition is that humans may be more success-
ful in invoking the relevant functionalities of apps, and thus can
achieve better code coverage with enough time and a large num-
ber of users. On another hand, app developers, especially those
who design malware, would not prevent their apps’ behavior from
being triggered under real execution environments. Hence, deploy-
ing dynamic analysis to public users for crowdsourcing solves the
code coverage problem. Besides the coverage problem, running on
emulators cannot analyze some environment sensitive apps. Petsas
et al. [27] proposed a range of techniques to evade dynamic analy-
sis in the emulated Android environment. With these techniques,
apps can bypass the analysis of the tools, e.g., CopperDroid and
DroidScope.
In this paper, we introduce our dynamic analysis system named
UpDroid. It gathers data from users’ daily running traces and gen-
erates sensitive behavior reports for the apps.
3 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Figure 1 shows the framework of UpDroid, which consists of two
major components: the monitoring module on the users’ devices
and the analysis module on the server side. We place two mon-
itors on Android devices to monitor sensitive behavior (e.g., ac-
cessing the camera) and collect runtime status (e.g., CPU usage)
of running apps. The data collected by both monitors is logged
with time stamps. The event monitor detects changes to resources
which can be accessed by third-party apps, e.g., the le system, to
reveal the apps’ behavior. We choose to use these changes to rep-
resent the sensitive behavior as low-level events are not accessible
on non-rooted devices. However, we cannot identify the initiating
app for the detected events without penetrating to apps or the sys-
tems. Hence, in the analysis module, we build an app identication
model with machine learning techniques to distinguish the initiat-
ing app from all running apps. We use learning to rank to train the
model with data from real users as presented in Section 5. We take
sensitive events and the corresponding runtime status of the apps
as inputs to identify the initiating apps for the monitored events
and generate behavior reports for the apps. In the following two
sections, we will present the technical details of the event monitor-






















Figure 1: Framework of the sensitive behavior monitoring
system - UpDroid.
4 EVENT MONITORING
This section describes howUpDroidmonitors sensitive events with-
out penetrating to either the apps or the Android internals on non-
rooted phones. To reveal the behavior of the apps, UpDroid pas-
sively captures the events triggered by sensitive behavior. Figure 2
presents four types of sensitive behavior that can be monitored by
UpDroid. The behavior is categorized by the resources, e.g., the le
system, it manipulates. For example, accessing the camera raises a
particular interrupt, so it belongs to the interrupt-based behavior.
We use dierent methods to monitor dierent categories of behav-
ior.
4.1 Content Observer
UpDroid uses the ContentObserver API to capture the behavior
that changes content providers. The method registerContentOb-
server(Uri uri, boolean notifyForDescendants, ContentO-
bserver observer) is used to register a content observer with the
corresponding URI, e.g., content://sms for observing SMS con-
tent. When an event is detected, the onChange() method will be
triggered. The ContentObserver only reports whether a content
provider is changed, but not what has been changed. Hence, we log
the monitored content provider and compare the updated provider
with that at a previous timestamp after receiving a change noti-
cation, in order to get detailed information for inferring the apps’
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Figure 2: Dierent categories of behavior that UpDroid can
monitor
behavior. For example, row adding of SMS content provider with
entry type=0 represents sending out an SMS, and row adding with
entry type=1 represents receiving an SMS. The entries for each
row also provide information, such as when the SMS is sent and
the recipient of the SMS. To nd all observable content providers,
we use PackageManager to list all providers which can be accessed
by external apps. For each provider, we query the corresponding
database to nd all table names which is also used as the path pre-
xes of the URIs of providers. From Android 6.0.1, we nd 21 sys-
tem provided content providers. Axplorer [4] can also identify the
system content providers that are protected by permissions, but it
does not lter out the ones that can only be accessed by the sys-
tem apps. Theoretically, UpDroid canmonitor all content providers
with the required permissions. However, due to the overhead of
logging and comparing the content providers, UpDroid only ob-
serves four of the most common and signicant content providers,
including SMS, call log, contacts and calendar events.
4.2 File Observer
To monitor events related to the le system, UpDroid uses File-
Observer API to monitor the les and directories on the exter-
nal storage. This API is provided by Android to capture changes
to a single le or a directory. Event masks (e.g., CREATE, DELETE
and MODIFY) are used to specify what kind of operation has been
performed on the monitored le or directory. A complete list of
the event masks can be found in Android API reference [16]. The
onEvent() method will be triggered when an event to the le or
directory is observed. Since this API only supports single le or
directory monitoring, we recursively traverse the monitored di-
rectory and register le observer for each le or directory under
it. Similar to ContentObserver, FileObserver only reports the
events but not the changing content. For example, FileObserver
does not report how the le is modied when it captures a MODIFY
event. Backing up the target directory is a possible solution to get
detailed information about the events, but this may bring in too
much space and runtime overhead. Hence, UpDroid only observes
dierent types of events to the les in the external storage and
ignores the detailed changes to them.
4.3 Interrupt Observer
A novel method we propose for observing events is to sample the
interrupts and monitor the changes of interrupt numbers. Android
inherits the interrupt mechanism of Linux. Interrupt represents the
situation where CPU interrupts the running program to handle a
request raised by an external hardware device. When the devices
(e.g., camera, Bluetooth and temperature sensor) detect physical
events, they raise interrupt requests. Then, the programmable in-
terrupt controller (PIC) will process these requests and send them
to the CPU. The CPU will nally respond to the interrupt requests.
Each specic interruptwill be registered to the systemwith a unique
Interrupt Request Line (IRQ) number, through which devices can
pass the interrupt to the processor. The virtual le /proc/interrupts
provides the interrupt request lines claimed by the devices. Each
line shows the unique IRQ number, the number of interrupts han-
dled by each CPU, the PIC, and the device name.
To identify the events from the number of interrupts, we sam-
ple the /proc/interrupts le each 100ms and compare it with
the previous sampling. Since most hardware devices have a corre-
sponding IRQ line, we can infer the running status of hardware
through monitoring the changes to the numbers of the interrupts.
The increases of the interrupts represent the sensitive behaviors.
For example, accessing the camera increases the number of inter-
rupt number 83 on Nexus 6P. Using Bluetooth to send a le to an-
other device will increase interrupt 503 continuously for a period.
In UpDroid, we choose to monitor the following ve common de-
vices: camera, GPS, Bluetooth, NFC and video decoder.
Most device names shown in /proc/interrupts are codedwith
the hardware model names or abbreviations, thus are dicult to
identify. For example, onHUAWEINexus 6P, pn548 is the interrupt
name of NFC and atmel_mxt_ts is for the touchscreen. Moreover,
there are dierent IRQ lines with the same device name. For ex-
ample, IRQ numbers 83 to 86 have the same device name csid, but
only number 83 represents the camera device interrupt. Hence, the
interrupt to hardware device mapping relies on the model names
of the hardware devices which are dicult to obtain automatically.
Eachmobile device has its ownmapping between interrupts and
hardware devices. Hence, we need to test the hardware devices and
analyze the interrupt sampling to identify the interrupt mapping
for each device model.We rst analyzed several devices we already
have, such asNexus 6 andNexus 6P. To cover other devices, we con-
duct a user study (named interrupt study) to obtain the mappings
for them. Each UpDroid user needs to nish this study to get the in-
terrupt mapping. The users need to perform certain operations to
test the hardware devices on the phones. Some of the hardware de-
vices can be tested automatically with proper programming. For
example, we write a program to open the camera and take pho-
tos automatically. The others require the users’ manual tests since
the permission of these devices are very strict. For instance, NFC
can only be manually turned on/o by the user for security con-
sideration of Android. While the user is performing the tasks, the
monitoring app samples the interrupts. By observing the changing
pattern of the interrupts, we can identify the one that corresponds
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to the hardware devices. For each hardware, we need ve traces
for manually identifying the interrupt patterns. From the recruited
participants, we have identied interrupts for 19 Android devices.
4.4 Network Observer
UpDroid monitors the networking behavior through VpnService
API, which leverages the TUN virtual network device to capture
the TCP and UDP packets sent by the apps. In this work, we lever-
age MopEye’s technique to identify the package initiators through
the proc le /proc/net/tcp6|tcp|udp|udp6 [35].
5 INITIATOR IDENTIFYING
The monitoring techniques presented in the previous section are
not able to identify the app that triggers the detected event since
the APIs used by the monitors are designed for observing the re-
sources. AlthoughMopEye [35] provides an intelligent solution for
app identication on network events, it is not applicable to other
events, e.g., interrupt-based events. Hence, UpDroid leverages a
machine learning technique, learning to rank, to build an app iden-
tication model which is generic for all events. This model takes
the detected event and the runtime information of the running
apps as input, and ranks all the running apps to nd out which
is the one that initiates the detected event.
The overview of the model learning is presented in Figure 3. To
get the ground truth for the model learning, we recruit Android
users as the inspectors to identify the apps that trigger the detected
events. After pre-processing the data from the inspectors and the
monitors, we use the learning to rank technique to train the iden-




























Figure 3: Overview of building the app identication model
5.1 App Status Monitoring
The runtime info monitor on the device collects information (e.g.,
CPU usage) about the running apps. We use the information as
the feature of each app to infer whether it is the one that invokes
the detected event. UpDroid uses the ps command to obtain the
runtime information of the apps. It leverages the /proc/stat and
/proc/$PID/stat interfaces to provide processes’ runtime status,
such as CPU usage, NICE value, virtual memory usage and so on.
It allows third-party apps to access other processes’ runtime info
on most Android devices. We obtain the result from ps command
from the monitoring app each 100ms. This time interval ensures
both the quality of the data and the performance of the device.
One problem with using ps command is that the runtime sta-
tus is for processes while identifying the process for an detected
event is nearly impossible for users. For each occurred event, nor-
mal users can easily select the correct app that invokes the event,
but can hardly tell which process without any knowledge about
the app implementation. In this case, we consider app rather than
process as the initiator of the detected events. We integrate the run-
time status from processes from one app and get the ground truth
of the initiators from the inspectors. More details of integrating
runtime info from dierent processes can be found in Section 5.3.
5.2 Data Collecting
We collect the data for building the app identication model from
the monitors presented in Section 4 and Section 5.1. The data con-
tains the events and the runtime information of each app when
an event occurs. The missing part is the ground truth that which
one among all the running apps invokes the detected event. To get
the ground truth, we recruit Android users to help to collect the
data and label the app in real-time. We gather three types of infor-
mation from the inspectors’ devices - the events, the runtime info,
and the initiating apps selected by the inspectors. We conduct a
user study (named initiator study)1 to collect and label the data. In
this study, each participant will be asked to install our monitoring
app published on Google Play and help to identify the apps at run-
time. The monitor will capture the events and log the runtime app
info. It would raise notications to the participants (or inspectors)
when it captures an event on the device. For each event, we pro-
vide the event type, the event content and the time when the event
is captured to the participant. The participant responds to the no-
tication and chooses the app that invokes the event based on the
provided info. To check the integrity of the data, we propose the
following policies to verify the participants’ responses:
(1) The selected app should be on the list of the running apps.
(2) The selected app should have the permission for the de-
tected event, e.g., the app chosen for a camera event needs
to be granted with the CAMERA permission.
(3) The selection should be nished within ten mins after the
notication, to make sure the user selects with a fresh mem-
ory.
We have recruited ten users since November 2017 to participate
in the initiator study for data collection and labeling. The partici-
pants are Android phone users above 18 years old. Participants in-
stall the inspecting app on their own devices and identify initiators
for at least 20 detected events. During the study, participants need
to have at least ten apps they commonly use installed on their de-
vices. We use the above policies to lter the responses from these
participants. In total, we have collected 300 events with initiator
1Both the interrupt study and the initiator study have been approved by IRB in May
2017
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identied. The initiators of these events correspond to 40 popular
apps, e.g., Instagram and WhatsApp.
5.3 Data Pre-processing
From the monitors and the inspectors, we obtain the raw data for
the analysis, including the detected events, runtime information
of apps and the app identied by the inspectors. To get the labeled
data, we pre-process the raw data in three steps. First, we obtain
runtime app info which can represent the running apps’ status for
each detected event. We choose the nearest samples of runtime
info before and after each detected event based on the timing info.
Hence, for each event, we know the apps’ current state and how it
changes after the event occurs.
Table 2: Features for running apps and the process combina-
tion rules
Feature Description Type Combination Rule
VSIZE Size of virtual memory used Integer average
RSS Resident set size Integer average
CPU CPU usage Integer average
SCHED Schedule of the process Integer average
PRIO Priority Integer average
NICE Nice value Integer average
PCY Background/Foreground Info Binary or
PC Status of processes Binary or
UID Whether the app is system app Bool none
Then, we combine runtime info from dierent processes of an
app. As mentioned in Section 5.1, we collect the apps’ runtime in-
formation by ps command which provides information about each
running process, while app is the analysis target. Hence, we com-
bine the runtime information of dierent processes from the same
app. Table 2 shows the features we collected for each app and how
they are combined from dierent processes. We use the dierence
of runtime information before and after the event as the feature
vectors. Here is an example of extracting feature f1 for an app. App
a has two processes: p1 and p2. Event e is observed at time t . The
process sampling provides the nearest process info logs at time t1
and t2, while t1 6 t 6 t2. The f1 value of p1 is v1 at t1 and v2 at
t2. The f1 value of p2 is u1 at t1 and u2 at t2. Hence, the processed
feature f1 of a for e is:
f1a = AVG (v2 −v1, u2 − u1)
Lastly, we identify the app that triggers it from the users’ re-
sponses and label all running apps. For each event, we label “1” if
an app is selected for it and label “0” if it is not selected.
5.4 Modelling and Precision
The machine learning technique we use for identifying the app is
learning to rank [9]. Our scenario is a ranking problem, where we
need to select an app that has the highest possibility of invoking
the event among a list of running apps. We use RankLib [11], a
library that contains several popular ranking algorithms, for the
modeling and testing. The model built by RankLib is generic for
all apps and all events.
We randomly pick two thirds of the data samples as the train-
ing data and the rest as the testing data. We tried all of the eight
Figure 4: The performance of dierent ranking algorithms
in RankLib library.
algorithms in RankLib with dierent congurations and compared
their performance. Figure 4 presents the precision, the percentage
of events the initiator of which can be successfully identied, of
the models built by dierent ranking algorithms. With the Lamb-
daMART algorithm, the precision of UpDroid can reach 80%, and
the false alarm (the situation where the app ranked rst does not
cause the event) rate is around 20%. From our observation, in one
data sample, dierent apps may have the same ranking score, and
this brings in a lot of false alarms. Hence, we list the appswith top1,
top2 or top 3 ranking scores to see whether they contain the one
selected by the inspectors. The precision comparison of the eight
algorithms is presented in Figure 4.
6 COMPARISON WITH API HOOKING
Various tools [22, 30, 40] analyze sensitive APIs to reveal the un-
derlying behavior of the target apps. For example, sendTextMes-
sage() reveals the behavior of sending SMS. These tools log the
APIs called by an app and record their parameters and return val-
ues by hooking all sensitive APIs, which typically requires root
permission or modication to Android internals. In this section,
we present the comparison between UpDroid and the API hook-
ing method on capturing the sensitive behavior.
6.1 Current State of API hooking
To analyze sensitive behaviors through API hooking, we need a
list of sensitive APIs and the permissions they require to dene
the behavior. Sensitive API refers to the API protected by certain
permission. Since 2011, researchers have studied to extract the list
of sensitive APIs from Android source code [3, 4, 7, 14]. From exist-
ing works, static analysis, including code analysis and annotation
analysis, is believed to be the most ecient and eective method.
However, from our investigation, none of the current methods can
provide a complete list of the sensitive APIs. The popular tool Ax-
plorer [4] provides an accurate list of the Android APIs in the An-
droid framework source code, but it misses the analysis of Java
APIs and the APIs whose permission checking is in native code.
Some popular sensitive APIs, such as android.hardware.camera-
2.CameraManager.openCamera(), are not in the list. DPSPEC [7]
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analyzes the annotation of Android source code to identify sensi-
tive APIs. However, it only focuses on the APIs protected by dan-
gerous permissions and needs manual identication to obtain the
list. Another work, android-a2p [14], is also based on annotation
analysis. It is released on GitHub and is accurate but not complete.
In order to cover more APIs for capturing a complete list of sensi-
tive behaviors, we combine the lists from these three works in the
comparison.
API hooking is also eective in capturing accessing to sensi-
tive content providers and passing sensitive Intent. DPSPEC and
Pscout [3] list the content providers and intents which need dan-
gerous permissions. We also include these sensitive components
in our comparison.
In this work, we use an open source tool named EagleEye [24]
which is built on the Xposed framework [36] to hook the sensitive
APIs and the APIs for accessing content providers and sending in-
tents on a rooted device.
6.2 Permission Coverage Comparison
To see how far UpDroid can go in covering dierent categories
of events, we analyze the permission coverage of UpDroid and
that of API hooking (including hooking sensitive APIs, content
providers, and Intents). We use 26 dangerous permissions and 44
normal permissions crawled from Google’s ocial documentation
for the comparison. If any sensitive API in the list uses certain
permission, we consider that API hooking covers this permission.
Also, if UpDroid can capture one kind of behavior which is pro-
tected by a permission, we consider that UpDroid covers this per-
mission. This comparison may have inaccuracy since neither sen-
sitive API nor UpDroid cover all the cases that a permission is used.
However, this analysis still gives us a hint about what kind of be-
havior UpDroid and API hooking can capture.
The comparison of dangerous permission coverage is presented
in Table 3. The list of sensitive API/Content Provider/Intent we
obtain from previous works covers 21/26 dangerous permissions,
while UpDroid covers 15/26. And 14 permissions can be covered by
bothmethods. As presented in Table 3, most of the ones that cannot
be captured by UpDroid are about reading data, e.g., READ_CAL-
ENDAR and READ_PHONE_NUMBERS. This is because UpDroid focuses
on the behavior that changes the state of resources on the device
while reading normally does not cause any change to them. The
comparison of normal permission coverage can be found in Table 5
from Appendix.
6.3 Event Details Comparison
API hooking can provide details about each event or behavior based
on the parameters and return value of an API, while UpDroid has a
dierent method of providing detailed information for each event.
We present the dierence of monitoring each category of events
as follows.
Content Provider:While observing content providers, the events
come from the changes to the providers. The detailed information
of the events can be obtained from changes to the rows in the
provider’s table. In the case of SMS activities, API hooking logs
the sendTextMessage() API in apps, while UpDroid observes the
content://sms content provider. Table 4 shows the information
Table 3: The comparison of dangerous permission coverage
between API hooking and UpDroid. In this table, ✗stands
for none of the permissions in this categorize is covered and









ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓
ADD_VOICEMAIL ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓
ANSWER_PHONE_CALLS ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
BODY_SENSORS ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
CALL_PHONE ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓
CAMERA ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓
GET_ACCOUNTS ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
READ_CALENDAR ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗
READ_CALL_LOG ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗
READ_CONTACTS ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗
READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
READ_PHONE_NUMBERS ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
READ_PHONE_STATE ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗
READ_SMS ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗
RECEIVE_MMS ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓
RECEIVE_SMS ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
RECORD_AUDIO ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
SEND_SMS ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
USE_SIP ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
WRITE_CALENDAR ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓
WRITE_CALL_LOG ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓
WRITE_CONTACTS ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
Total ✓ 21/26 15/26
Table 4: The SMS event details provided byAPI Hooking and
the content observer of UpDroid
Info API Content Provider
Destination Address ✓ ✓
Source Address ✓ ✓
Message Text ✓ ✓
Sent Intent ✓ ✗
Delivery Intent ✓ ✗
Date Initiate ✓ ✓
Date Sent ✗ ✓
Person ✗ ✓
we can obtain from API hooking and content observing. Hooking
APIs can get more low-level information, such as the Intent for
sending this SMS. UpDroid can get more general information, such
aswhen the SMS request is generated and when the SMS is success-
fully sent out.
Interrupt: The monitoring based on interrupt sampling observes
events from the changing of the number of the corresponding inter-
rupt. It tells whether an event occurs and when it occurs through
the changing pattern. Take Bluetooth interrupt as the example.
Tracing API android.bluetooth.BluetoothAdapter.enable()
can detect turning on of the Bluetooth on the devices. On the other
hand, UpDroid observes it through recognizing a steep increase of
the interrupt. Using Bluetooth continuously (e.g., sharing les) will
be represented by a continuous slow increase.
External Storage: As presented in Section 4, the information we
can log from the le observers contains the le operation and the
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path of the le in external storage. To log the changes to the les,
we need to back up the target les and make a comparison. To
decrease the overhead, we choose only to record the operations
and the paths. Existing API hooking method can hook le opera-
tion APIs, such as java.io.writer.write(String s). It tells not
only which operation is performed, but also the related content,
e.g., the content that is written to a le.
Network: In the case of network activities, UpDroid provides lower
level information than API hooking, e.g., a TCP packet is sent by
UID 10080 from 10.0.8.1:38175 to a server at 74.125.24.95:443.
No higher level information, e.g., whether the packet is sent for
loading a webpage, will be provided. The parameters and the type
of the API imply the behavior of the app and the detailed informa-
tion related to the behavior. It allows identifying dierent opera-
tions from the calledAPI, e.g., android.webkit.WebView.load(S-
tring URL) represents loading a URL to a WebView.
6.4 Behavior Outcome Comparison
API hooking logs each attempt at using an API and needs further
analysis to nd out whether the called API is successfully invoked
or not. Even with further analysis, it still misses the results of some
app behavior. Contrarily, the four types of events reported by Up-
Droid represent the behavior that had successfully been performed.
This is because itmonitors the changes to public resources that will
be manipulated by the apps’ behavior. Here we compare the dier-
ences between UpDroid and API hooking in revealing the outcome
of an attempt at performing a certain operation.
API hooking can use several ways to determine whether an API
call is successfully called. The rst and most apparent one is to
check the return value. For example, android.Bluetooth.Blueto-
othAdapter.enable() returns boolean -“true to indicate adapter
startup has begun, or false on immediate error”. The second way is
to check the exceptions thrown by the API. For example, if send-
TexMessage throws IllegalArgumentException, the message is
not successfully sent because of empty destination address or text.
Anothermore complicatedmethod is to hook the callbacks as stated
in the parameters. For example, android.hardware.camera2.Cam-
eraManager.openCamera(String cameraId, CameraDevice.St-
ateCallback callback, Handler handler) has a parameter
named callback. The callbackwill be invoked once the camera starts.
For some other APIs, the callback is an intent which will be in-
voked after the API is successfully called. Comparing to the prior
twomethods, checkingwhether theAPI call succeeds or not through
the third method needs more advanced API hooking techniques.
These techniques should be able to obtain the callback from the
API’s parameter, hook it and determine whether the callback is in-
voked due to the API call. Hence, we only consider the rst two
methods in our analysis of the sensitive APIs.
From our analysis of the sensitive APIs, 154 out of the 400 do
not have any implication about the result of the API call. And
among the 154, there are 29 which use the permissions that can be
covered by UpDroid. Among these 29, there are 14 that UpDroid
conveniently reveals the outcome of the attempts. The rest is the
APIs that do not change public resources on the devices. For ex-
ample, android.net.ConnectivityManager.requestNetwork()
requests network but does not send out packages, so the behavior
cannot be detected by UpDroid. UpDroid can determine whether
the behavior of the app changes the resources, but it cannot deter-
mine which API is used to trigger an event. UpDroid places more
emphasis on the result of the app’s behavior, while API hooking
emphasizes more on the attempt of the app’s behavior.
7 CAPABILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the capabilities of UpDroid by analyz-
ing its permission coverage and testing it on several popular apps.
We also present the runtime performance of UpDroid evaluated
with a popular benchmark app.
7.1 Permission Coverage
To evaluate whether UpDroid can detect the sensitive behavior
that requires commonly used permissions, we analyze the permis-
sion usage of both malicious and benign apps. We analyze 2000+
malware samples (chosen from 72 malware families) provided by
AndroidMalware Dataset Project [33] and 3000+ apps downloaded
from the top chart of Google Play. For each permission, we count
the number of apps that declare the permission in the manifest
to nd out the popular permissions used by malicious and benign
apps. The dangerous permission usage is shown in Figure 5. As pre-
sented, the permissions from WRITE_CONTACTS to ANSWER_PHONE_C-
ALLS can be covered by UpDroid. The results show that UpDroid
covers the widely used permissions. And it cannot cover the ones
for reading private data or the phone states which will not cause
any state changing of the observable resources on the device.
7.2 Runtime Experiments
To evaluate how UpDroid performs at runtime for capturing sensi-
tive behavior, we test it on several popular apps, including a com-
munication appWhatsApp, a social networking app Facebook, and
an online shopping app Lazada. These apps have more sensitive
behavior than most of the malware. We manually run the apps for
ve minutes while using UpDroid and API hooking to detect the
sensitive behavior.We nd that UpDroid successfully captures sen-
sitive behavior, such as sending SMS, accessing the camera, open-
ing Bluetooth and so on.
Specically, we present the experiment on WhatsApp which
uses various permissions and compare the results (as shown in Fig-
ure 6) of UpDroid and API hooking. The upper gure presents the
behavior captured by UpDroid, and the lower one presents the per-
mission usage detected by API Hooking. The upper gure shows
that UpDroid detects Bluetooth events, camera events, le opera-
tions and network activities of WhatsApp. Compared to API hook-
ing, UpDroid detects the events whichmanipulate public resources
on Android. For network events, UpDroid detects the packages
sent out or received, while API hooking reports the access to the
network state. Although API hooking can also detect the internet
usage, no internet activity is found due to the incompleteness of
the sensitive API lists. This also happens on the Bluetooth activi-
ties and le operations. As shown in Figure 6, using Bluetooth is
monitored by UpDroid at the fth minutes, but it is not observed
by API hooking. UpDroid captures multiple le system operations
which are not detected by API hooking. It also shows that UpDroid
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Figure 5: Dangerous permission usage of malware samples from AMD and benign apps from GooglePlay


























Figure 6: The runtime analysis results of WhatsApp from UpDroid and API hooking
cannot detect the read permissions like READ_PHONE_STATE and
WAKE_LOCK.
7.3 Performance
To evaluate the runtime overhead of UpDroid, we run the monitor-
ing module of UpDroid on Nexus 6P with Qualcomm Snapdragon
810 processor and 3GB RAM. We install ten popular apps on the
device and keep three of them running in the background. We use
one of the most popular benchmarks, Antutu Benchmark, to grade
the device with and without UpDroid running on it. The result is
presented in Figure 7. The y-axis is the score graded byAntutu. The
higher the score is, the faster the CPU runs. In total, UpDroid de-
creases the benchmark score by 15%. The overhead mainly comes
from the high sampling rate of the interrupt numbers and the fre-
quent use of ps command. There is a trade-o between the accu-
racy and the performance. The evaluation is conducted with a de-
vice released in September 2015. We believe that the overhead can
be decreased on more powerful phones.
Figure 7: Performance of UpDroid evaluated with Antutu
Benchmark
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7.4 Discussion
In this section, we discuss how UpDroid can avoid anti-analysis
techniques and the possibility of using UpDroid as an attack tech-
nique. We also present the limitations of UpDroid.
UpDroid is a dynamic analysis system which is transparent to
malware. The monitoring module of UpDroid is implemented with
the APIs widely used by app developers (e.g., ContentObserver
and VPNService). The anti-analysis techniques are dicult to evade
UpDroid. Among all theAPIs, VPNService is technically detectable
but cannot be used by malware as an indicator, because VPN is
widely used by mobile users who need secure and private net-
work. It is also quite popular among Chinese users for accessing
blockedwebsites. Instead of detecting APIs commonly used by nor-
mal apps, malware tends to use heuristics which imply the running
environment is under analysis (e.g., invalid IMEI number and ab-
normal GPS info). On the other hand, it would be an advantage
when all malware stops its malicious behavior after detecting Up-
Droid on the users’ devices.
UpDroid is designed for analyzing the underlying app behavior,
but the techniques used can also be applied to maliciously monitor
the users. The monitoring technique that uses /proc/interrupts
can be applied to side-channel attacks, which monitor sensitive
behavior on the device without any permission needed. The app
identication model also starts a study to break the process isola-
tion on Android.
The limitation of UpDroid is that it requires access to /proc
le system which is protected by critical SELinux policies since
Android 7. From Android 7, the ps command cannot access the
process info of other processes. Hence, we need to identify other
runtime info, e.g., time for launching the other apps, as the feature
of each app in the future. Android 8 prevents third-party apps to ac-
cess /proc/interrupts. Hence, UpDroid may not be signicantly
eective on devices with Android 8 but still works on a larger pro-
portion of devices with prior Android versions. AppBrain shows
that the market share of Android SDK versions prior to 8.0 is 95.4%
in April 2018 [2].
8 RELATED WORK
Various dynamic tools/platforms have been proposed for analyz-
ing Android apps underlying behavior. DroidScope [37], Copper-
Droid [30], VetDroid [40], DroidBox [22] and other tools analyze
the API calls, system calls, or other features to reconstruct app be-
havior. For example, CopperDroid can reconstruct the apps’ behav-
ior, e.g., sending SMS, by observing and dissecting the system calls.
These tools are based on app instrumentation, framework modi-
cation or emulator instrumentation, which need input generator
tools to automatically run the target apps. UpDroid can also de-
tect sensitive behavior of Android apps. The dierence is that Up-
Droid can be applied to devices used by the general public while
these tools have critical requirements for either the running envi-
ronment or the target apps.
Andromaly [28], CrowdDroid [8] and other tools can also run
on non-rooted devices for app analyzing. These tools detect run-
time features, e.g., system call logs and side channel info, of the
running apps and use these features to identify whether the app
is benign or not with machine learning techniques. UpDroid gath-
ers the running features and uses machine learning techniques to
identify the apps that invoke the captured events. Meanwhile, Up-
Droid generates ne-grained reports of apps, while these tools only
classify the apps. App Guardian [39] also gathers side channel info
and detects malicious behavior, e.g., on non-rooted devices. How-
ever, the detection is based on specic heuristics and only targets
runtime information gathering attacks.
BareDroid [25], Ninja [26], Njas [5] and other works provide
dynamic analysis techniques which are resistant to anti-analysis
techniques. BareDroid is an analysis system which uses a phone
cloud for the analysis. It needs to customize the devices in the
phone cloud and thus cannot be applied to devices used by the
public. Ninja needs to customize the rmware on the Android de-
vices. It is also dicult to be applied to devices used by the pub-
lic. Njas provides sandboxing for unmodied apps on non-rooted
devices. It dynamically loads the target app’s APK le to the sand-
boxing app’s context for fully accessing the target app’s resources
and runtime state. Njas relies on an app database and needs to ob-
tain the APK le of the target app at the same version. Njas cannot
sandbox the apps which do not have a readable APK les, e.g., the
paid apps. Although these analysis systems are transparent to anti-
analysis techniques, they cannot be applied to devices used by the
general public directly. Compared to these systems, UpDroid can
be easily deployed on the users’ devices without any modication
to the systems or any requirement on the target apps.
As well as current dynamic analysis techniques, other works
also give us inspiration about the runtimemonitoring. Diao et al. [13]
propose to use the interrupt time series produced by the touch-
screen controller to infer the unlock pattern and foreground app.
We dig deeper to interrupt to infer the sensitive behavior. Mop-
Eye [35] leverages the VpnService API to monitor the network
usage of the apps. UpDroid also uses this technique to detect net-
work activities on the devices.
9 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In conclusion, we present our eorts on the dynamic analysis of
app behavior under unmodied and non-rooted devices. We pro-
poseUpDroid - a system for dynamically monitoringAndroid apps’
sensitive behavior. It uses dierent APIs to monitor Android sys-
tem at runtime and leverages learning to rank technique to iden-
tify the initiator of the detected behavior. We use the permission
coverage, the runtime experiments and the comparison with the
traditional API hooking method to demonstrate the capabilities of
UpDroid. The results show that UpDroid can detect sensitive be-
havior that manipulates the resources of the devices and identify
the apps that trigger the behavior. Currently, the number of partic-
ipants in the initiator study is small. In the future, we will obtain
labeled data from more users to build a more precise identication
model and deploy the system to crowdsourcing for real applica-
tions, e.g., malware detection.
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APPENDIX
Table 5 presents the comparison of normal permission coverage
between API hooking and UpDroid. From this table, API hooking
covers 24/44 normal permissions, while UpDroid covers only 5/44.
Although UpDroid does not cover many normal permissions, it
covers the popular ones, such as BLUETOOTH and NFC.
222
WiSec ’18, June 18–20, 2018, Stockholm, Sweden Xiaoxiao Tang, Yan Lin, Daoyuan Wu, and Debin Gao
Table 5: The comparison of normal permission coverage be-
tween API hooking and UpDroid. In this table, ✗stands for
none of the permissions in this categorize is covered and











✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
ACCESS_NOTIFICATION_POLICY ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
BLUETOOTH ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓
BLUETOOTH_ADMIN ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓
BROADCAST_STICKY ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
CHANGE_WIFI_
MULTICAST_STATE
✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
CHANGE_WIFI_STATE ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
DISABLE_KEYGUARD ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
EXPAND_STATUS_BAR ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
GET_PACKAGE_SIZE ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
INSTALL_SHORTCUT ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
INTERNET ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
MANAGE_OWN_CALLS ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
NFC ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓
READ_SYNC_SETTINGS ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗
READ_SYNC_STATS ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗
REORDER_TASKS ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
REQUEST_COMPANION_
RUN_IN_BACKGROUND
✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
REQUEST_COMPANION_USE_
DATA_IN_BACKGROUND
✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
REQUEST_DELETE_PACKAGES ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
SET_ALARM ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
SET_WALLPAPER ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
SET_WALLPAPER_HINTS ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
SIGNAL_PERSISTENT_
PROCESSES
✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
TRANSMIT_IR ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
USE_FINGERPRINT ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
VIBRATE ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
WAKE_LOCK ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
Total ✓ 26/35 5/26
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